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DIVERSIFICATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FCC
THE Federal Communications Commission is charged with the administrative
task of licensing and supervising telecommunications facilities under the man-
date of serving "public convenience, interest, or necessity."' In exercising the
discretion to grant,2 modify 3 or revoke 4 telecommunications authorizations, the
FCC has been designated the sole formulator of an affirmative public interest
standard.5 Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals may review
the Commission's decisions,6 that court has been reversed when it sought to
substitute its own judgment for the plenary administrative discretion vested
in the FCC.
7
1. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1952).
For discussion of the administrative machinery of the Commission, see Schilz, New
Techniques for Expediting Hearings in FCC Proceedings, 55 COLUm. L. Rxv. 830, 831
nn.1-7 (1955).
2. 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1952).
3. 66 STAT. 717, 47 U.S.C. § 316 (1952).
4. 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1952).
5. "In granting or withholding permits for the construction of stations, and in grant-
ing, denying, modifying or revoking licenses for the operation of stations, 'public
convenience, interest, or necessity' was the touchstone for the exercise of the Com-
mission's authority.... [I]t serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of dis-
cretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative
policy."
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940). Cf. National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
6. Under the Federal Radio Act of 1927, c. 169, § 16, 44 STAT. 1169, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals was authorized to "alter or revise the decision appealed from
and enter such judgment as to it may seem just." Cf. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1940); Federal Radio Comm'.n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464,
467 (1930). This power to determine administrative policy was soon terminated by statu-
tory amendment. Act of July 1, 1930, c. 788, 46 STAT. 844, amending 44 STAT. 1169 (1927).
The present law governing judicial review of FCC decisions is the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1093, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
7. See Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 105 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1939), reversed,
309 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1940) ; cf. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 204
(D.C. Cir. 1955), reversed, 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
"The selection of an awardee from among several qualified applicants is basically
a matter of judgment, often difficult and delicate, entrusted by the Congress to the
administrative agency .... [T]he Commission's view of what is best in the public
interest may change from time to time. . . . [s]uch matters . . . are not for the
judiciary."
Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"[The duty of the judiciary ends] when we find that the action of the Commission
was based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The broad "public interest" criterion furnished by the Federal Communica-
tions Act to guide administrative policy is focused by the act's proscription
of an authorization if "the purpose is and/or the effect thereof may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or restrain commerce." 8 This directive must be
viewed in the context of the technical conditions peculiar to the telecommuni-
cations industry. Unlike such mass media as the press, wherein only con-
sumer saturation and advertising availability set the ultimate limits upon entry
and expansion, the number of radio and television stations that can function
effectively is curbed by the very limited number of frequencies that can be
utilized without mutual interference.9 Because of this inherent barrier to
free and open competition, diversification of control over the available outlets
assumes special significance in the formation of an affirmative "public interest"
standard.
Although the FCC is not expressly directed to police antitrust violations
in telecommunications, 10 its authorization policy must recognize that diffusion
of power within the industry is necessary to foster the economic and political
values molding antitrust philosophy." Free entry into radio and television
granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the 'public interest' will be
furthered or retarded. .... .
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943). See Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276 (1933).
8. 48 STAT. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1952).
9. See notes 32, 151, 169 infra; cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
10. Under 48 STAT. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1952), and 48 STAT. 1086 (1934),
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 311 (1952), the Commission is directed to refuse authorization
to a party whose license has been revoked in an antitrust litigation. Cf. Wall & Jacob,
Comnunications Act Anendmentts, 1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEo. L.J. 135, 169-70
(1953).
In the past the Commission has, on its own findings, denied authorization of an appli-
cant guilty of predatory practices injurious to commerce. See Mansfield Journal Co., 3
PIKE & FischER RAno REG. 2014, 2028 (1948) (PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. hereinafter
are cited as "RADIO REG."); Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir.
1950) ; cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (subsequent antitrust
prosecution and conviction of parties denied authorization by the Commission); Com-
ment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 78, 88-90 (1950); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1342, 1347-48 (1950).
The Commission has been aware that its mandate to serve the public interest en-
compasses antitrust policy:
"The prohibitions of the Sherman Act apply to broadcasting. This Commission,
although not charged with the duty of enforcing that law, should administer its
regulatory powers with respect to broadcasting in the light of the purposes which
the Sherman Act was designed to achieve."
FCC, CHAIN BROADCASTINa REPORT 46 (May 2, 1941).
"It is our duty ... to refuse licenses or renewals to any person who engages or
proposes to engage in practices which will prevent either himself or other licensees
or both from making the fullest use of radio facilities."
Id. at 83.
11. "Nothing in the provisions or history of the Act lends support to the inference
that the Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station not operating
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is precluded by natural obstacles; authorizations once granted are not easily
revoked; and advertising revenue is, for the radio or television licensee, the sole
source of income. Against this background, the ownership of several telecom-
munications facilities by one party creates very real dangers to competition.1
2
When a party owns newspaper, radio and television facilities in the same
geographical area, "unaffiliated" operators--owners of only one mass medium
outlet 1 3-- are placed at a serious competitive disadvantage. 14 The "concen-
trated" owner can utilize joint facilities and staffs, and combined advertising
services, to realize the cost savings that may be the first step in monopolization.rS
This greater efficiency is more likely to be turned into a destructive force if
the party has exclusive control over one of the media. For example, if the
owner of a newspaper and a radio station holds the sole television franchise
in the area, it can utilize forms of tying contracts to attract advertisers who
wish to use all three means of reaching consumers, thus choking off the revenue
available to its press and radio rivals.' 6 Similar results obtain when a party's
in the 'public interest' merely because its misconduct happened to be an 1,nconvicted viola-
tion of the antitrust laws." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
223 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
12. Senator Kilgore proposed treating ownership of television stations by radio
licensees as per se violations of the antitrust laws. See Broadcasting-Telecasting Mag.,
March 15, 1954, p. 58; id., March 8, 1954, p. 114. But see Heckman, Diversification of
Control of the Media of Mass Communication-Policy Or Fallacy?, 42 GEo. UJ. 378,
396-97 (1954).
13. The terms "affiliated" and "unaffiliated" as used in this Comment make reference
to the extent of a party's stock ownership of, and interlocking control with, other facilities
in the mass media. Unless specifically designated as such, these terms do not refer to
affiliation with television or radio networks.
The term "concentrated" refers to a party with extensive mass media holdings. No
attempt will be made to formulate a quantitative definition of concentration, such a de-
termination being left to the Commission's case-to-case evaluation. See note 14 infra.
14. The owner of key authorizations and other key media facilities "can use his
bargaining power to obtain other advantages, and these follow from the pure concentration
of economic power. At some place the Commission should be able to draw the line...."
Statement of the Commission, 24 U.S.L. WEEx 3230 (March 6, 1956). See National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943); cf. Comment, 18 U. CHI.
L. REv. 78, 88-90 (1950).
15. For Commission discussion of this problem with specific emphasis upon the ad-
visability of enfranchising newspaper applicants, see 7 FCC ANN. R I. 25-26 (1941). See also
98 CONG. REc. 7417 (1952); 9 FED. REG. 702-03 (1944).
Despite the competitive advantage of the cost savings factor, the Commission has
shown equal concern for the "possible disadvantages in terms of duplicated and wasted
effort by operating personnel." WMBD, Inc., 11 RADIO REG. 533, 603 (1956) ; cf. Sacra-
mento Broadcasters, Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 615, 642n (1955).
16. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), affirming 92 F.
Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (sole newspaper refused to deal with advertisers using
competing radio station) ; cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953) (party with sole morning newspaper used joint rate "unit" plan to heighten
competitive position of its rivaled evening paper).
For a Commission discussion of tying contracts and joint advertising rates, see
WKRG-TV, Inc., 10 RADIo Rza. 225, 265-66 (1955).
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holdings are scattered throughout distinct markets. For example, a party may
own several television stations in different areas of the country. Although it
may be met with competition in each locality, it has a superior bargaining posi-
tion in competing for highly lucrative network affiliations.' 7 This party
also has greater access to national advertisers who wish to reach each of the
localities. In either situation, its widespread holdings augment its competitive
position in each community.
Concentration of ownership in radio and television is equally incompatible
with the political goals of a democracy. The commodities of telecommunications
are ideas, molding the taste and opinion of viewers and listeners. The citizens of
a free society must have access to diverse sources of verbal dissemination, 18 a
condition frustrated when one party dominates the local means of communi-
cation. Ownership of outlets in several regions creates power blocs with sub-
stantial political influence, a result incompatible with the distribution of power
demanded by democratic tenets.
Freedom of entry is the prerequisite of a vibrant competitive system in
business and ideas. Because radio and television, by their very nature, limit
the number of participants, an affirmative diversification policy is needed to
prevent further restraints. The actual degree of concentration necessary to
create economic and political dangers may vary from case to case. But in every
instance there is a manifest need to curb from the outset the abuses which con-
centration engenders.
While diversification is a major goal in the allocation of broadcasting facili-
ties, such a policy is confronted by countervailing factors, such as the need for
rapid authorization. For example, an area as yet unserviced by television re-
quires immediate access to the new medium. However, the sole applicant for
the one television outlet which technical conditions permit to be allocated to
the area may already control the local newspaper and radio station.'0 This
party alone may be willing to enter the television field, because his already
established facilities for news gathering and advertising placement offer him
economies of dual operation not available to other potential applicants. Under
these circumstances, the policy clash is sharply focused. Although there'is an
17. "The ownership of a large number of stations by a single group has many re-
strictive effects. Single stations find themselves at a substantial disadvantage in
competing with the multiple owner of a group of stations possessing superior eco-
nomic power. In competing for network affiliations, this disadvantage is most
marked.... It is apparent that the superior bargaining position which such multiple
owners possess makes competition by a single station owner for an NBC or CBS
affiliation a pretty meaningless game ......
Plotkin, Memorandum Prepared for the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1955).
18. "The First Amendment ... rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public ... ." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). Cf. Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953).
19. For congressional discussion of this hypothetical, see 98 ConG. REc. 7421 (1952).
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immediate need for the service, reinforcement of the applicant's control of the
sources of dissemination serving the area will intensify his influence over the
minds of the local public, and may effectively deter future entry of an inde-
pendently owned mass medium. Moreover, the reduced advertising rates which
economies of joint staff enable the established party to offer may well represent
an insuperable obstacle for potential competitors in other mass media.
Constantly faced with similar, if less extreme, conflicts, the FCC has been
equivocal in its recognition of diversification as a cardinal factor in granting
authorizations.2 0 In its most affirmative statements, the Commission has recog-
nized the public interest in promoting "diversification of ownership in order to
maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints as well as to pre-
vent undue concentrations of economic power contrary to the public interest."
21
And when the Commission has sought to effectuate this goal, it has been sup-
ported by the judiciary.22 The Supreme Court has emphasized that under the
Communications Act, the FCC is not limited to the function of traffic officer,
mechanically processing and granting applications that meet minimal technical
and financial standards.2 3 Rather, the Court has defined the FCC's province
as "determining the composition of that traffic," with promotion of diversi-
fication as a salient criterion.
2 4
But, despite contrary administrative and judicial pronouncements, the FCC
has generally failed to give proper weight to diversification as an affirmative
20. See SIEPMANN, RADIo, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY 25-36 (1950); Heckman, supra
note 12 (construing administrative and legislative statements as justifying complete aban-
donment of diversification policy in all but the actual monopolization context).
21. IS FED. REG. 7796, 7797 (1953). Cf. Statement of the Commission, 24 U.S.L.
WEEK 3230 (March 6, 1956).
"The Commission is of the opinion that where there is a choice between two
applicants, one of whom has a television station and another which does not, public
interest is better served by granting a license to the newcomer other factors being
substantially equal rather than to the person already having a television station.
Under this policy, it is possible for the maximum number of qualified people to
participate in television and not have it restricted to a few large interests."
Bamberger Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 3 RADIo REG. 914, 925 (1948).
22. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), reversing
220 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1955), in which the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's rule-
making power to proscribe certain multiple ownership patterns as repugnant to the public
interest. See also McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 13 RAnlo REG. 2067 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 27, 1956); cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
But cf. Courier Post Publishing Co. v. FCC, 104 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
23. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943). But cf.
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (dictum that once minimum
competence and financial standards are met, a grant will be made in the public interest) ;
Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (dictum that
when the minimum qualifications have been established, the public interest is protected).
24. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) ; see United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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element in the establishment and application of a "public interest" standard.25
In selecting among competing candidates for an available outlet, the Commission
has preferred concentrated but experienced applicants to unaffiliated new-
comers.26 When confronted with applicants all of which had substantial mass
media affiliations, the Commission has been willing to enfranchise that appli-
cant deemed least concentrated.27 In thus relegating diversification to a second-
ary role, the Commission has not considered whether the need for present
authorization is outweighed by other factors, and whether the public interest
dictates rejection of all the concentrated applicants.28 Similarly, in passing upon
the request of a sole applicant for an available station, the FCC has not evaluated
whether diversification as a positive goal would be fostered or injured by the
grant. 29 Nor has the Commission's policy shown sensitivity to the fact that
an initial grant ensures virtually perpetual enfranchisement. 30 Whether so lax
an approach to diversification is justifiable in the radio licensing context in
which it developed is doubtful. 31 But that such a negative diversification
policy is totally inimical to the public interest in television licensing is certain.
For entry into this vital new medium for disseminating news, entertainment
and opinion is far more limited by technical obstacles than was entry into
radio.32 In view of the compelling reasons for fostering diversification in
telecommunications, present administrative policy deserves appraisal, with focus
upon both the role of diversification in station allocation and the manner of re-
solving conflicts with other objectives. This analysis will permit a suggested
approach for the most perplexing problem confronting the FCC: maximum
utilization of UHF-VHF television facilities.
THE IULTIPLE OWNERSuIP RULES: AN INADEQUATE SAFEGUARD
The multiple ownership rules constitute the only screening standard which
the FCC has devised to ensure diversified control in radio and television. These
rules deny without hearing the application of a party already owning an identical
25. For a review of FCC practices see, Heckman, supra note 12; Note, 59 YALE L.J.
1342 (1950); cf. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 6 RADIO REG. 994, 1036 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
26. See notes 67, 69, 75 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 57-66 infra and accompanying text.
28. See text at notes 62-66 and 146-47 infra.
29. See notes 102-05 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 88-91 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. R'v.
78, 90-91 (1950) ; Notes, 59 YALE L.J. 1341 (1950) ; 36 VA. L. Ray. 232 (1950).
32. As of 1954, there were operating in the United States 2,616 AM, 559 FM and
only 411 television stations. See note 156 infra.
Although the television allocation master plan formulated in 1952 theoretically pro-
vides for optimum authorization of 1,875 stations, under present conditions 2/3 of these
may be doomed to economic destruction if authorized. See notes 158-62 infra and accom-
panying text.
[Vol. 66: 365
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FCC
type telecommunications outlet in the same primary service area.3 3 In addition,
the rules draw the conclusive presumption that nationwide ownership of more
than seven AM, seven FM or seven television stations 34 represents a concen-
tration of control against the public interest.
35
While the spirit of the multiple ownership rules clearly favors diffused
ownership of telecommunications facilities, in operation the rules provide a
totally inadequate screening standard. The glaring defect of the rules lies in
their unrealistic focus upon hitra-medium concentration alone.3 6 Although an
applicant already owning an AM, FM or television station is precluded from
obtaining a second identical-type outlet operating in the same primary service
area, the rules are oblivious to an equally repugnant concentration pattern-
ownership of an AM, FM and television station all serving the same locale.
3 7
And while the rules summarily proscribe the acquisition of an eighth television
station even if the applicant has no other mass media holdings,3 8 they allow
the grant of a seventh television outlet to a party already controlling seven AM,
seven FM and six television stations.
33. See Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.240(a) (FM), 3.35(a) (AM), 3.636(a) (1)
(Television) (Supp. 1956).
34. See Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.240(b) (FM), 3.35(b) (AM), 3.636(a) (2)
(Television) (Supp. 1956).
The multiple ownership rules take cognizance of the UHF-VHF television dichotomy,
discussed in text at notes 151-70 infra, to the extent of providing that within the seven
television station limit "no more than five . . . may be in the VHF band." 47 C.F.R.
§ 3.636 (a) (2) (Supp. 1956).
The numerical limits incorporated into the rules were formulated so as not to divest
the holdings of any party as of the time the rules were promulgated. See Statement of the
Commission, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3231 (March 6, 1956) ; cf. 18 FED. REG. 7796-99 (1953).
35. The rules pertaining to FM, AM and television multiple ownership, notes 33, 34
supra, provide in footnote that:
"The word 'control' as used herein is not limited to majority stock ownership,
but includes actual working control in whatever manner exercised.
"In applying the foregoing provisions to the stockholders of a corporation which
has more than 50 voting stockholders, only those stockholders need be considered
who are officers or directors or who directly or indirectly own 1 percent or more
of the outstanding voting stock."
36. Regardless of the seven station limit, the rules provide, e.g., that an FM license
be denied if "such party, or any stockholder, officer or director of such party, directly or
indirectly owns, operates, controls, or has any interest in, or is an officer or director of any
other Fill broadcast station if the grant of such license would result in a concentration
of control of Fill broadcasting in a manner inconsistent with public interest, convenience,
or necessity." 47 C.F.R. § 3,240(b) (Supp. 1956). (Emphasis added.) For the compar-
able AM and television provisions, see 47 id. §§ 3.35(b), 3.636(a) (2).
It should be noted that each of these rules, though espousing diversification policy,
concerns itself with intra-medium holdings and abuses alone.
37. For examples of grants resulting in such local concentration patterns, see cases
discussed in notes 57, 69, 75 infra and accompanying text.
38, See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), reversing 220
F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; cf. Note, 43 GEo. L.J. 671 (1955).
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Moreover, the rules are clearly inadequate in making no mention of news-
paper holdings.39 Although newspapers do not fall within the direct purview of
the Communications Act, their relevance to the problem of mass media con-
centration is evident. 40 The press is the leading means of influencing public
opinion and, as an alternative market for advertising placement, should not be
ignored in evaluting the leverage advantages that may inhere in the grant of
an outlet. 41 The complete omission of newspaper holdings from the scope of
the multiple ownership rules may reflect the belief that the press must be
allowed entry into related media in order to survive.42 But while an absolute
prohibition against the entry of newspaper owners into the telecommunications
field might seriously impair the vitality of the press, a total failure to take cog-
nizance of newspaper interests in determining whether or not a given grant will
serve the public interest is unjustified.
The presence of the multiple ownership rules has hindered far more than
helped the development of an affirmative diversification policy. The rules
rigidly proscribe a limited number of concentration patterns; they do not
sanction diversification as an end in itself. And though the FCC is free to
act both by rule-making and by ad hoc determination, 43 the very existence of the
multiple ownership rules has caused the Commission to rely upon them as
the exclusive safeguard of the public interest in diversification. Accordingly,
the FCC has been willing to license any applicant whose mass media holdings
do not exceed the limits set by the rules. Though the rules should not be dis-
carded, they should be broadened to include inter-media holdings, and must
39. The fault is not solely that of the Commission. Congressional committees have in
the past cautioned the FCC about discriminating against newspapers in any manner. See
S. REP. No. 741, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1950) ; 98 CONG. REC. 7390-91 (1952). But see
id. at 7399, 7417-19.
A proposed 1952 amendment specifically proscribing newspaper discrimination was
dropped as unnecessary because the committee felt that the existing law was sufficient to
prevent the Commission from denying a newspaper's application "solely because of any
such interest, association, or ownership." H.R. REP. No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1952). For discussion, see Heckman, supra note 12, at 390-97.
40. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1342
(1950) ; cf. Notes, 64 HARv. L. REv. 947, 950 (1951); 36 VA. L. REv. 232, 244 (1950).
But see Heckman, supra note 12.
41. "[Newspaper licensees] create an unbalance in the competitive structure and econ-
omy of the non-newspaper stations serving the same community." 98 CONG. REc. 7417
(1952).
See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), affiruing 92 F. Supp. 794
(N.D. Ohio 1950); Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940) ; Stahlman v. FCC, 126
F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
42. The newspaper share of total national advertising expenditures dropped from 79%
in 1929 to 34.7% in 1951. See discussion and sources cited in Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602-04 (1953).
43. The multiple ownership rules have been held a valid exercise of Commission power
under the act. See note 22 supra. Cf. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r)
(1952) ; Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. Rv. 78 (1950).
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be supplemented by case-to-case appraisal of the impact of a given grant on
diversification objectives.
THE COMPARATIVE HEARING: "COMPARATIVE" PUBLIC INTEREST
The comparative hearing provides an administrative forum for selecting
from competing applicants for a single authorization that party in whose hands
a grant will best serve the public interest.44 The FCC will exclude from con-
sideration in the initial stages of the hearing any applicant which does not meet
minimum standards of competency and capitalization 45 or is disqualified by
the multiple ownership rules.46 Once these screening requirements have been
satisfied, an applicant is eligible to compete for the franchise. The fundamental
premise of the comparative hearing is that a grant to any party passing the
initial screening tests will serve the public interest, and that the Commission's
function is merely to determine which of the applicants is relatively more
capable of doing so. 47 The Commission has repeatedly stated that parties
satisfying the screening requirements but unsuccessful in the comparative hear-
ing would have been awarded the outlet had they been the sole applicant.48
After the initial elimination of parties failing to meet the screening require-
ments, the comparative hearing resembles a civil proceeding among rival
litigants. 49 The scope of the hearing is ordinarily limited to those issues stipu-
lated by the parties in the prehearing order that emerges from conferences
among the applicants. 5° When diversification has not been emphasized as a
44. See 48 STAT. 1096 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1952) ; Rules of the FCC,
47 C.F.R. § 1.385 (Supp. 1956); cf. 48 STAT. 1083, 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 307 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp. III, 1956).
For a full discussion of the formal elements of comparative hearings, see Schilz, New
Techniques for Expediting Hearings in FCC Proceedings, 55 COLUmn. L. REy. 830 (1955) ;
cf. Wall & Jacob, Comnunications Act Amendments, 1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEo.
L.J. 135, 145 (1953) ; Notes, 52 YALE L.J. 671 (1943) ; 64 HARV. L. R~v. 947 (1951).
45. See 48 STAT. 1089 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (1952) ; cf. 48 STAT.
1084 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1952); Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. §
3.24(b) (Supp. 1956) ; 2 RADio REaG. ff 53:24 (Supp. 1956) (collecting cases) ; Scripps-
Howard Radio v. FCC, 189 F2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
46. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text. On occasion, it is impossible to
assay without a hearing whether a party fails to comply with the multiple ownership rules
or minimum standards of competency and capitalization. In such instance, the party
is permitted to enter the comparative hearing wherein findings are made on these minimum
qualifications. See, e.g., Oregon Television, Inc., 9 RADIo REG. 1401, 1445 (1954) (inquiry
into financial qualifications during course of hearing).
47. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); Johnston
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
48. See, e.g., Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 10 RADio Ra. 1224 (1955) ; cf. notes 69 and 75
infra.
49. The parties utilize such civil procedures as depositions, exchange of exhibits,
and prehearing conferences. See 48 STAT. 1096 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 409
(1952) ; Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.387, 1.724, 1.813, 1.821 (Supp. 1956) ; cf. Schilz,
supra note 44, at 838.
50. The pre-hearing orders consolidating the applicants' direct cases "shall control the
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competitive issue by one of the adversaries, it has not been stressed by the
Commission on its own motion, despite that body's role as representative of
the public interest.51
The focus in comparative hearings upon selection of the relatively most quali-
fied candidate originated when concentrated ownership of mass media facilities
was not a major problem. The Radio Act of 1927 52 was enacted to free the
nation's air waves of the cacophony resulting from the operations of numerous
amateur broadcasters and small commercial stations. The Radio Commission
was created to pare down the ranks of already operating broadcasters to the
optimum number permitted by technical conditions. 53 Charged with the single
task of curtailing current activity in radio, the Commission did not need to
develop affirmative, long-range policies for future allocation of outlets to poten-
tial applicants. Understandably, the Commission's practice was merely to com-
pare the existing operators in order to determine who should be permitted to
survive.54 When the Radio Commission had completed its traffic engineering
task, Congress created the FCC to fulfill the need for positive administrative
course of the hearing unless modified by the Hearing Examiner for cause during the course
of the hearing or by the Commission upon a review of the Hearing Examiner's ruling."
Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. § 1.841 (Supp. 1956).
The act, 48 STAT. 1094 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1952), gives the Commission power
to institute its own studies in any case before it. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1940). However, the Commission is seemingly unwilling to delay
proceedings by full investigation. See Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1955) ; cf. Schilz, supra note 44, at 834.
51. See Heckman, Diversification of Control of the Media of Mass Coniniunication-
Policy or Fallacy?, 42 GEo. L.J. 378 (1954) (favoring the Commission's choice of a de-
limited role) ; cf. Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 361 (1954) (denying petition to
enlarge issues).
The Commission's action as mere traffic controller rather than guardian of the public
interest has been criticized. See Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 210-11
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
52. Radio Act of 1927, c. 169, 44 STAT. 1162 (repealed by the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1102, 47 U.S.C. § 602 (1952)).
53. The chaos of broadcasting interference under the inadequate Act of 1912, c. 287,
37 STAT. 302 (repealed by the Radio Act of 1927, c. 169, § 39, 44 STAT. 1174), was the
subject of an urgent presidential message to Congress calling for immediate creation of a
policing agency. 68 CoNG. RFc. 32 (1926).
See WANn, RADIO AND TEL.vIsIoN LAw 777 (1948) ; 68 CONG. REc. 1034, 1411, 1704,
2112, 2750, 3117 (1926-27); Note, 36 VA. L. REV. 232, 236 (1950).
54. "[T]he test [of] 'public interest' . . . becomes a matter of comparative and
not an absolute standard when applied to broadcast stations. Since the number of
channels is limited and the number of persons desiring to broadcast is far greater
than can be accommodated, the commission must determine from among the appli-
cants before it which of them will, if licensed, best serve the public."
2 FED. RADIO Comm'N ANN. REP. 169-70 (1928).
Cf. Goss v. Federal Radio Conin'n, 67 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; Davidson v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 61 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
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regulation of the rapidly expanding telecommunications field.55 But despite the
broader policy-making area of the new Commission, and despite the dangers in-
herent in emergence of concentrated holders, the FCC has perpetuated its
predecessor's practice of automatically licensing the "relatively best" applicant
-however disserving of the public interest a grant to any of the available
candidates may be. In selecting the successful candidate, the Commission has
held diversification determinative only when the applicants have been adjudged
substantially equal on all other relevant criteriaY0
The FCC has insisted on its policy of enfranchising the relatively best
competitor even when all the applicants controlled substantial communications
facilities. In Radio Wisconsin 7 the Commission held that numerous regional
holdings were relatively less repugnant than more intense local concentration.5 8
The two competitors for the one available Madison VHF television outlet were
Badger Television-owner of one of the four AM and one of the three FM
stations serving the locale and itself substantially controlled by the only two
Madison newspapers-and Radio Wisconsin, which also owned one local AM
and one local FM station and was affiliated with five AM, three FM and three
television stations serving the regional area of Wisconsin, Iowa and Minne-
sota.0 9 In addition, the controlling stockholder of Radio Wisconsin had
controlling interests in four major Wisconsin newspapers."0 Awarding
the grant to Radio Wisconsin, the Commission stated that the com-
munications interests of the successful applicant were not "of such extent
that they must be deemed to offset Badger's substantial concentration in
Madison,"" 1 and that the grant "would not contravene our general policy of
encouraging diverse ownership of all mass media of communications. '6 2
55. See 43 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-606 (1952) ; FCC v. Potts-
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
The new agency was also given broad jurisdiction over telegraph and telephone facili-
ties in order to achieve a unified, far-reaching regulatory policy in the telecommunications
field. See SocoLow, THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 54-60 (1939); WARNER, RADIO
AND T=VsioN LAW 786 (1948); cf. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934);
Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 232 (1950).
56. See note 85 infra and accompanying text. For full discussion, see McClatchy Broad-
casting Co., 9 RADIO RE. 1190, 1220i-j (1954).
57. Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 1224 (1955).
58. The Hearing Examiner had recommended that the locally concentrated applicant
be favored on diversification principles, on the ground that its total holdings in the mass
media were numerically less than its rival's. Id. at 1245. Cf. Southland Television Co., 10
RADIO REG. 699, 749 (1955).
For comparison by the Commission of local concentration with holdings that are more
numerous but scattered, see KFAB Broadcasting Co., 12 RADIO REG. 317 (1956) ; Radio
Fort Wayne, Inc., 9 RADIO REG. 1221 (1953) ; Lubbock County Broadcasting Co., 6 RADIO
REG. 949 (1951).
59. 10 RADIO REG. at 1246-48.
60. Id. at 1247. This controlling stockholder also had newspaper interests in Minnesota
and Louisiana. Ibid.
61. Id. at 1246.
62. Id. at 1248.
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Radio Wisconsin illustrates the inadequacies of the Commission's policy of
automatically awarding an available outlet to the relatively most qualified
applicant. An affirmative diversification policy would not sanction such un-
critical licensing, in view of the substantial control of regional mass media
facilities which both competing applicants already enjoyed. Grant of Madison's
one technically permissible VHF television outlet to a concentrated holder will
not only preclude future entry of an unaffiliated party into this vital sphere
of telecommunications, but may well impair the financial health of independent
mass media facilities operating in the locale. After the grant, Radio Wisconsin
held AM and FM radio stations and a television franchise in Madison. Were
it to utilize the leverage advantages inherent in control of the sole VHF outlet
and to offer reduced rates made possible by economies of joint staff, it could
obtain an increased share of the total advertising revenue expended for radio
and television coverage6
3
These deleterious effects of the grant might have been outweighed by the
public interest in rapid authorization had the Madison area been as yet un-
serviced by television. But the record reveals that the residents of the locale
were already being served by two UHF television stations.0 4 The Commission
did not consider the presence of these outlets as obviating the need for rapid
authorization. Rather it assumed, as it has in analogous cases, that an affirma-
tive diversification focus was unnecessary since there were already other voices
reaching the locale.65 Nor did it consider that the VHF enfranchisement of
Radio Wisconsin may well force the UHF licensees to cease operations. 0
Such superficial analysis exemplifies the FCC's refusal to consider diversifica-
tion as an affirmative goal to guide station authorization, especially in the ab-
sence of conflicting factors.
Experience v. Diversification
While the FCC has negated diversification principles when confronted only
by concentrated applicants, its policy toward diversification has been even more
unsound when both concentrated and unaffiliated candidates have competed
for the same outlet. In numerous cases the need for new, independent sources
63. See notes 12-17 supra, 164 infra; Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 14 RADIo RE. 129, 130
(1956) (denial of protest for reconsideration).
64. 10 RADIO REG. at 1233, 1249.
65. Id. at 1247.
66. Id. at 1250 (dissenting opinion). For full discussion of the competitive handicaps
faced by the UHF operators, see notes 157-64 infra. The Commission's drastically limited
concept of what constitutes the "public interest" is amply illustrated by its subsequent
action in the case, denying UHF operators' petitions to stay the VHF grant to Radio
Wisconsin. The Commission's action in enfranchising one concentrated operator at the
substantial risk of destroying two unaffiliated licensees would tend to indicate that the
FCC has moved so far as to consider diversification irrelevant to the "public interest";
"The matters asserted by the petitioners are: the effect of a Channel 3 grant
in Madison upon them, upon UHF service in Madison and the Madison area and
thus upon the public. Petitioners' interest therefore does not concern matters
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of dissemination has been subordinated to the criterion of "greater broad-
casting experience." 7 The Commission has failed to show awareness that
experience and diversification are often inversely related: experience and a
past record of program service can be achieved only through ownership of or
affiliation with existing telecommunications facilities. Because of their greater
broadcasting experience, concentrated holders have been licensed in preference
to unaffiliated applicants who have passed the minimal screening standards,
despite pronouncements that a grant to any candidate not initially eliminated
in a comparative hearing will serve the public interest.68 When faced with the
choice between experience and diversification, the Commission should note
that while lack of experience is cured with time, lack of diversification is not.
Two recent cases illustrate the FCC's indiscriminate emphasis upon experi-
ence as the determinant in station authorization. In TBSC 69 one of the
applicants for Hartford's only VHF television outlet already owned AM and
FM stations in the locale and was controlled by the city's largest bloc of insur-
ance companies.70 The other candidate was unaffiliated with any mass media
and was formed by a number of local citizens to seek and operate the available
channel. 71 The Commission found that the two applicants were virtually equal
in terms of "integration of ownership and management, preparation for tele-
vision, staff proposals, proposed studios and facilities, [and] program policies
and proposals."7 2 It also asserted that.Telecasting, the unaffiliated applicant,
merited a distinct preference as to diversified control of mass media.7 None-
theless, the Commission held that this preference was outweighed by TBSC's
meritorious record of past performance and by its radio experience, 74 advan-
tages which, of course, the unaffiliated newcomer could not rival.
The Commission's failure to regard diversification as an affirmative goal of
outlet allocation is also exemplified by the recent Biscayne 75 decision. Three
litigated in the comparative Channel 3 proceeding, to wit: would Radio Wisconsin
or Badger better serve the public interest."
Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 13 RADio REG. 349, 356-58 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
67. See, e.g., cases discussed notes 69-80 infra and accompanying text; cf. Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc., 11 RADio REG. 985, 1042 (1956).
68. See notes 23 and 45-48 supra.
69. Travelers Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 12 RADIo REG. 689 (1956).
70. Id. at 699, 765-84.
The Commission determined that control by the locale's largest financial bloc would
not impair TBSC's service. But cf. Midland Broadcasting Co., 3 RADIO REG. 1961 (1948)
(Commission preferred owner of sole newspaper in locale over applicant closely affiliated
with locally dominant industrial corporation which employed 90% of the community's
workers).
71. 12 RADIo RFG. at 701-03, 712-19. One proposed officer was connected with two
stations in Santa Barbara, California, but was in the process of negotiating for the sale
of one, and proposed to resign his chairmanship of the other. Id. at 806c.
72. Id. at S0 ,d.
73. Ibid.
74. Id. at 806d-e.
75. Biscayne Television Corp., 11 RADio REG. 1113 (1956).
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of the four applicants competing for an available Miami VHF channel were
owned entirely by local citizens who had no affiliation with any mass media
facilities.7 6 The two leading stockholders of Biscayne Television Corp.,
the fourth applicant, each controlled one of the two dominant newspapers in
the Miami area.77 In addition, each of these stockholders held an AM and FM
station in Miami, as well as vast newspaper and telecommunications interests
elsewhere. 8 The Commission rejected the recommendation of its Broadcast
Bureau that, the applicants being substantially equal on all major criteria, the
outlet should be awarded to one of the three unaffiliated candidates to foster
diversification.79 Instead, it awarded the grant to Biscayne, justifying such
action in terms of the greater experience of Biscayne's principals in the mass
media and the consequent assurance of good programming. It minimized the
fact that Biscayne constituted a merger in telecommunications of the city's
two dominant competing newspaper interests, and that a grant to any of the
other qualified applicants would have added a new, independent source of dis-
semination to the locale.80
In both TBSC and Biscayne the Commission found that the allocation area
was already being serviced by a number of television stations. Hartford resi-
dents were able to receive clearly five channels from neighboring cities,81 while
three television stations were already operating in Miami.8 2 In each case, the
Commission asserted that this existing coverage minimized the importance of
a diversification focus and justified the elevation of experience as the guiding
allocation criterion.8 3 Such reasoning is erroneous. While the presence of
alternative sources of dissemination may preclude a monopoly hold on the
locale by a concentrated grantee, it cannot eliminate the public interest in foster-
ing new, unaffiliated voices in the telecommunications field. Admittedly in
some contexts experience may reasonably be held to outweigh the counter
policy of diversification; when a locale has no television service, an experienced
operator may reasonably be deemed necessary to provide immediate optimum
programming.8 4 In contrast, when an area is already effectively serviced by
a number of channels, the Commission can well afford to permit an unaffiliated
newcomer to gain experience by broadcasting.
TBSC and Biscayne indicate the inadequacy of a procedure that invokes
diversification principles only when the parties are substantially equal on all
other grounds. Very often the affiliated applicant with substantial holdings in
the same or in related media is the only one that can show a past meritorious
76. Id. at 1161.
77. Id. at 1162.
78. Id. at 1122-25.
79. Id. at 1163.
80. Id. at 1162-65.
81. Travelers Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 12 RADIO RxG. 689, 698 (1956).
82. Biscayne Television Corp., 11 RADIo RFG. 1113, 1119 (1956).
83. Id. at 1162-65; Travelers Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 12 RADio REG. 689, 806c-e
(1956).
84. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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record. If the applicants must be equal in experience before diversification
becomes a controlling factor, the less experienced unaffiliated party will seldom
receive the franchise.
In other cases the Commission has been more aware of the public interest.8 5
On occasion it has completely reversed its policy of preferring the experienced
applicant to the newcomer. The lack of experience of the unaffiliated candidate
has been characterized as "freshness of approach,"'8 6 a qualification meriting
preference over run-of-the-mill past experience. But the FCC's failure to de-
velop a consistent affirmative policy has left the status of diversification unclear.
And the Commission's repudiation of diversification in the cases where that
factor seemed most relevant has undermined the healthier precedents set in
less extreme cases.
Renewals
In determining whether to renew the license of an established party or to
enfranchise competing applicants, the FCC has given little weight to diversi-
fication principles. An unaffiliated newcomer has rarely displaced a more
concentrated licensee, despite the statutory caveat that a license represents an
authorization for a limited time to which no property rights attach.87 The
Commission's focus in the renewal hearing has been in favor of the existing
licensee. Unlike the case where all applicants are initially seeking an outlet,
vast expenditures for facilities and good will have been made by one party
which it would be inequitable to declare forfeited-unless the licensee has oper-
ated against the public interest.88 Cognizant of the Commission's approach
85. For cases wherein the Commission has enfranchised the less affiliated applicant
in the interest of diversification, see WIIBD, Inc., 11 RADIO REG. 533, 607-08 (1956);
Evansville Television, Inc., 11 RADio REG. 411, 456-57 (1956) ; KTBS, Inc., 10 RADio REG.
811, 876a (1955); Southern Tier Radio Serv., Inc., 11 RADio RE. 143, 207 (1954);
McClatchy Broadcasting Co., 9 RADIo REG. 1190, 1220i-j (1954); Northeastern Indiana
Broadcasting Co., 9 RADIo RE. 261, 317-18a (1953).
86. See, e.g., Oregon Television, Inc., 9 RADIo REG. 1401, 1451 (1954); cf. Indianapolis
Broadcasting, Inc., 12 RADIO RE. 883 (1955).
87. "It is the purpose of this chapter ... to provide for the use of such channels, but
not ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by
Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond
the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301
(1952). See 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1952) (calling for signed waiver by
any licensee of claim to any particular frequency); 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1952) (providing that no license shall be granted for a period of
more than three years); Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.34 (Radio), 3.630 (Television)
(Supp. 1956). Cf. Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945) ; Comment, 18
U. CHI. L. REv. 78, 80 (1950).
88. In the renewal context the "public interest" standard seems met by compliance with
minimum technical, legal and financial screening requirements. In those few instances
where the Commission has denied renewal, the ground has been legal incompetence, based
on concealment of facts and misrepresentation. See FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946) ;
Broadcast Serv. Organization, Inc., 3 RADIo REG. 979 (1947). Inability to comply with
the minimum financial and legal requisites was the original Radio Commission's main
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and anxious to foster administrative processing efficiency, in 1952 Congress
amended the act's provision which had required the renewal applicant to file
the quantum of information and proof called for on the part of an initial appli-
cant.89 The existing statutory requirement that the renewal serve the public
interest was not changed. 0 Under an affirmative public interest standard this
clause alone will justify enfranchising an unaffiliated contestant instead of re-
newing the license of a party that has acquired additional holdings.,' But in
view of the equities which the Commission feels favor the renewal applicant,
diversification objectives will be forever impaired unless an affirmative policy
is effected at the licensing stage, prior to the outlay of investments and the
establishment of operations.
ground for refusing renewal. See Boston Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 67
F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Beebe v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 61 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1932):
Sproul v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 54 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1931); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n
v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Technical*Radio Lab. v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 36 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
No case has been found by the writer wherein renewal was denied on diversification
grounds.
89. 66 STAT. 714, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1952), amending 48 STAT. 1083 (1934). See
H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. S (1952) ; Hearings Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 658, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 253-79 (1951).
For a discussion of the possible delimiting effects of this amendment upon Commission
discretion in refusing renewals, see Wall & Jacob, Conunnications Act Amzendments.
1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEo. L.J. 135, 166-68 (1953).
90. The avowed purpose of the amendment was to aid administrative efficiency and not
to restrict "public interest" considerations. See H.R. REP'. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1952) ; Hearings, supra note 89.
The Commission had objected to the amendment, arguing that it appeared to afford
the renewal applicant a virtually perpetual franchise subject only to meeting the minimum
screening requirements. Id. at 71-74.
However, the fault lies with the Commission and not Congress. Certainly, under a
"public interest" standard based upon compliance with minimum screening requirements,
a license will be a virtually perpetual franchise. But under an affirmative approach to the
"public interest," the amendment as such would apply no barriers to effectuation of diversi-
fication goals. See S. RzPx. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951) ; cf. Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee m Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1973,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 119-28 (1949).
91. However, Commission precedent would indicate that under its concept of the
"public interest," such renewal would probably be granted. Even prior to the congressional
amendment, note 89 supra, the Commission had virtually eliminated diversification considera-
tions from the renewal context. In Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 6 RADIO REG. 994 (1951),
the Commission was confronted with the choice of renewing a party with a mediocre
past programming record, id. at 1035-36a (dissenting opinion), or enfranchising a highly
qualified newcomer. Although finding that the newcomer was superior on major com-
parative criteria, id. at 1026-34, 1036, and that, in contrast to the newcomer's unaffiliation,
the incumbent controlled one television, three AM, and two FMV stations, plus vast news-
paper interests, id. at 1031-32, the Commission nonetheless renewed on the basis of the
"clear advantage of continuing the established. . . ." Id. at 1034.
Cf. Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
S. 658, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 149-50 (1951).
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Modifications
The equitable considerations justifying subordination of diversification prin-
ciples in a renewal hearing are not applicable when a licensee, over the oppo-
sition of other parties, desires a modification broadening his presently authorized
scope of operation.92 In this context, the competing applicants are not attempt-
ing to divest the licensee of the franchise he currently enjoys. The modification
applicant wants to expand his present broadcasting range by increasing the
power of his current frequency authorization or by switching to a more de-
sirable frequency. The competing applicants are interested only in the new
frequency or in the grant of an outlet which the power increase will technically
preclude.
Because television has but recently emerged as a significant medium, the
FCC has not yet encountered a substantial number of modification hearings in
this field. In the radio context, however, it has already established unhealthy
precedents. In Hampden-Hampshire 93 Holyoke's one radio licensee, controlled
by the major stockholder of the locale's only newspaper, sought to expand its
broadcasting coverage to reach neighboring Springfield, Massachusetts. An
unaffiliated applicant desired to establish a new outlet in Springfield, which
authorization would have been technically impossible if the modification request
were granted. 4 The FCC found that the two communities had equal need for
increased broadcasting 95 and that authorization of the Springfield applicant
would not impair the Holyoke station's current operation. 96 Nonetheless, on
the basis of the established party's meritorious performance record, the FCC
awarded the modification in preference to enfranchising the unaffiliated appli-
92. The act specifically provides for involuntary modifications on the Commission's
own initiative, and calls for notice thereof to be served upon the licensee. 66 STAT. 717, 47
U.S.C. § 316 (1952). Cf. Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); L. B.
Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
The "modification" discussed in the text refers to voluntary action on the part of a
licensee seeking to expand operations, either through a power increase or frequency change.
This may bring the licensee into comparative hearings with other applicants for the same
frequency or power residue. Cf. 48 STAT. 1083, 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307
(1952), 47 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp. III, 1956).
93. The Hampden-Hampshire Corp. (WHYN), 4 RADIo REG. 504 (1949).
94. Id. at 508-09.
95. Id. at 515. This finding was critical since 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 307(b) (1952), has been interpreted to require a two-stage final analysis when
applicants in different communities compete to operate on the same mutually exclusive
frequency. The first stage calls for determination of which community has greater need
for the authorization in issue. If one community is favored, the applicants from the other
communities are virtually eliminated from final consideration. See Hanford Publishing
Co., 3 Riwo REG. 1281, 1287 (1947) ; cf. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S.
358, 362 n.4 (1955) ; Belleville News-Democrat, 4 RADIO REG. 1043, 1057 (1950).
96. The Holyoke station had been operating on a totally different frequency from the
one applied for, and would have been able to continue its current operation even if the
Springfield applicant had been enfranchised. 4 RADIo REG. at 506, 515-16; cf. Democrat
Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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cant.97 Thus the Commission rejected the opportunity to add a new, qualified
source of dissemination to the region without displacing existing licensees. 9s
The Commission should not import such a negative diversification focus into
the context of television modifications.
THE SOLE APPLICANT: AUTOMATIC ENFRANCHISEMENT
In comparative hearings, the public interest in diversification has been rele-
gated to secondary consideration. In the sole applicant context, the FCC has
given that factor no force at all, except for eliminating those applicants barred
by the multiple ownership rules." In appraising whether a grant to a sole
applicant will serve the public interest, the Commission has adhered to the
"relatively best" orientation developed in comparative proceedings, and since
there is no rival with which the applicant is compared, this party invariably
"wins." Because the Commission has failed to recognize that the public inter-
est is more than a "relative" concept and demands a determination in each
case whether rapid authorization should prevail over conflicting diversification
goals, any sole applicant satisfying minimum statutory requirements and the
multiple ownership rules is automatically assured a franchise.'0 0
The Communications Act provides that a sole applicant may be authorized
without a hearing only when the Commission finds, on the basis of the party's
application, that the grant will serve the public interest.' In applying this
statutory standard, the Commission has granted key outlets without a hearing
to sole applicants which already controlled the mass media serving the com-
munities in question. In Birney lines, Jr.102 the Commission granted the one
VHF television outlet allocated to Columbus, Mississippi to an applicant already
owning a radio station and the only daily newspaper in the locale as well as
two other AM stations nearby.' 03 In Southern Newspapers 104 the party
97. 4 RADIO REG. at 516.
98. "We also recognize that a grant to the Springfield applicant would provide a
new and additional service to the Springfield-Holyoke metropolitan district ....
However, we cannot accept this factor as controlling. Otherwise, an existing station
seeking to improve its coverage ... would always be barred by a qualified applicant
proposing to construct a new station on the operating assignment requested by the
existing station." Ibid.
The Commission's position might have been tenable had the Holyoke licensee been
unaffiliated, but in the instant case, the modification applicant already controlled the mass
media serving the locale.
99. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
100. But cf. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (refusal to
enfranchise sole applicant because of flagrant predatory practices).
101. 48 STAT. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (b) (1952).
102. 10 RADIo REG. 1192 (1954).
103. Commissioner Hennock's was the sole voice dissenting from the Commission's
summary action:
"The attenuation of healthy competition among local mass media has become
painfully visible in many communities in other parts of the country where the local
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granted the first VHF station in Hot Springs, Arkansas already owned a
VHF station in nearby Texarkana and five AM stations in Arkansas; it also
owned the only two daily papers published in Hot Springs and had ties with
over seventy other papers in the region. 0 5
The applications of Birney Imes and Southern Newspapers should not have
been granted without a hearing. As virtually perpetual franchises, these author-
izations will permanently foreclose a segment of telecommunications from
potential entry by qualified unaffiliated parties. Such indiscriminate authoriza-
tions create the risk that the grantees will consolidate grips on the communities'
mass media by utilizing leverage advantages and economies of joint staff to
gain a competitive edge over future rivals. The grants need not have been de-
nied without hearing; the demand of the local community for immediate tele-
vision servicing may have outweighed the deleterious consequences of enfran-
chising a heavily concentrated applicant. But certainly a full hearing should
have been conducted by the FCC to determine whether the public interest
in rapid authorization should have prevailed over the public interest in diversi-
fication.'06 Through the vehicle of a hearing, the Commission should have
examined and weighed such factors as the ability of the local audience to receive
television programs from nearby stations, the technical availability of other
outlets in the locale besides the one requested, and the economic feasibility
of television operations in the locale by an unaffiliated grantee.
"Pay-oifs"
So long as the FCC pursues its policy of licensing unopposed applicants
automatically, any party meeting the statutory minima may obtain an authori-
economy is even better able to support competing media than here. This underscores
the responsibility of the Commission for ascertaining fully the real extent to which
applicant dominates mass media in the Columbus area. Just the bare facts con-
tained in the application as to mass media owned by applicant indicate clearly a
concentration of control which, however, cannot be fully and realistically assessed
without eliciting the full facts in a hearing." Ibid.
104. 10 RADio RE. 59 (1954).
105. Virtually all of these interests were concentrated within a radius of 125 miles.
Ibid.
Commissioner Hennock was the lone dissenter. After outlining the vast holdings of
the grantee, the Commissioner stated:
"[T]he applicant here is being granted the first VHF station in Hot Springs
which is 90 miles away from its existing VHF station in Te-arkana. The power
and influence that go with a TV station in the VHF band, combined with the power
and influence the Palmers already have through their vast newspaper, broadcast
and other interests, may, by their sheer weight, not only adversely affect the develop-
ment of competitive practices in the field of mass communications in that area, but
also restrict the opportunities of the people of Arkansas to receive views and in-
formation from diverse sources which is so essential to the welfare of the public.
Whether such concentration of the mass media in the hands of one family is in the
public interest should not be determined without a hearing." Id. at 60.
106. See notes 103 and 105 supra and accompanying text.
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zation by achieving sole applicant status. Moreover, the Commission has
applied no effective sanctions against a party's becoming a sole applicant by
paying prospective rivals not to compete. Though censuring the party selling
out to a competing applicant, 10 7 the Commission has consistently refused to
penalize the buyer.' 08 So long as the amount paid to the withdrawing applicant
may be construed as reimbursement for application expenses, the Commission
has proceeded to process and grant the application of the party purchasing sole
applicant status.10 9
Such a failure to police the suppression of potential competition by a party
seeking enfranchisement is especially repugnant to the public interest in diversi-
fication. A party with vast holdings in the mass media can purchase expertise
of staff and superior programming but it cannot buy unaffiliation. In the context
of a comparative hearing, this concentrated applicant would incur the risk of
losing out to a "substantially equal" unaffiliated candidate. By financially in-
ducing formidable competitors to relinquish their aspirations, the concentrated
party can elude the pitfalls of the comparative hearing and exploit the conces-
sions afforded a sole applicant.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has recently censured the Com-
mission for adopting such a cursory approach to the detrimental effects of
the "pay-off." In Clarksburg 11o the court reversed the Commission's denial
107. Pursuant to Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. § 1.366 (Supp. 1956), the Commission
has on occasion dismissed with prejudice applications withdrawn after hearings had been
scheduled or had actually commenced. Dismissal with prejudice bars consideration of "a
like application involving service of the same kind to substantially the same area by sub-
stantially the same applicant . . . until after the lapse of 12 months from the effective
date of the Commission's order." Rules of the FCC, 47 id. § 1.363(a). See Four States
Broadcasters, Inc., 3 RADIO REG. 1545, 4 RADIO REG. 640 (1948) ; cf. Hanover Broadcasting
Co., 4 RADIO REG. 523 (1948)
108. See, e.g., Independent Television, Inc., 12 RADIO REG. 685 (1955) (grant despite
$25,000 reimbursement for withdrawal); Arkansas Television Co., 11 RADIO REG. 359
(1954) (initial order) (grant despite $60,000 reimbursement for withdrawal) ; KMYR
Broadcast Co., 9 RADIO REG. 496 (1953) (grant despite $125,000 reimbursement for not
filing exceptions) ; cf. Cherry & Webb Broadcasting Co., 11 RADIO REG. 859, 909 (1955)
(grant despite $200,000 "option" characterized by dissent as a "pay-off" for agreement
not to compete).
109. See, e.g., KMYR Broadcasting Co., 9 RADIO REG. 496 (1953). The authorization
was granted notwithstanding the fact that all the Commission had before it was an un-
itemized $125,000 "expense reimbursement" statement, characterizing the paym¢kit a
compensation, inter alia, for ". . . miscellaneous items that are usually connected with this
type of an application, and other unforeseeable items which cannot presently be estimated,
expenditure directly connected with this application." Id. at 498.
The dissenting opinion points out that:
"The 'expenses' for which KMYR is to be reimbursed are not itemized, and
the Commission has no documentation relating to them other than as has been set
forth above. The record does not show whether all the expenses alleged were
actually incurred, or whether the expenditures made were made to prosecute its
application, or whether the amounts expended were reasonable." Id. at 498a.
110. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
The recipient of the protested Clarksburg, West Virginia VHF grant already dominated
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of a protest lodged against a grant to a concentrated sole applicant "'- a grant
which had been made one day after a "reimbursed" applicant had withdrawn.
112
The court found that the Commission's summary approval of the remaining
applicant's $14,000 payment was in disregard of administrative responsi-
bility.113 Recognizing that it could not substitute its own determination of
the public interest for that of the FCC," 4 the court ordered a full hearing of
the protester's allegations and a complete inquiry into all the circumstances sur-
rounding the pay-off. The court suggested that the Commission should refuse
to make any grant rather than approve action contrary to the public interest."15
The Commission should revamp its policy along the lines suggested by the
Clarksburg court and consider treating the pay-off as a predatory practice
the mass media in the region through its own operations and those of its parent corporation
and the parent's affiliates and subsidiaries. In the broadcasting field, the grantee owned
an AM station in Clarksburg and AM and FM stations in nearby Parkersburg. Its parent
corporation had working control of AM, FM and VHF television stations in Wheeling,
only 58 miles away. In addition, the parent corporation published newspapers in nine
West Virginia cities, including the above mentioned. These newspapers accounted for
over 65% of tie region's readership circulation. Id. at 518.
The protester, a Clarksburg, West Virginia daily newspaper, was found by the Com-
mission to have "party in interest" standing required by the protest provision of the act,
48 STAT. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (1952), by virtue of the direct
competitive injury that would be caused a competing medium which also relied upon
advertising as its main source of revenue. 225 F.2d at 514 n.8.
For a general discussion of standing to protest, see Wall & Jacob, Communications
let Amendments, 1952-Clarity or Ambiguity, 41 GEo. L.J. 135, 145-51 (1953) ; Note,
55 CoLUm. L. REv. 209 (1955).
111. Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., 10 RADIo REG. 190 (1954) (original grant), 10
RADio REG. 969 (1954) (denying protest).
112. 225 F.2d at 519.
113. "The extent to which the Commission may wish to require itemization of
expenses, identification of the parties negotiating the agreement, and details of the
arrangements between competing applicants, in order to determine if improper
consideration was paid or promised for dismissal, is a matter for the Commission's
judgmnt. But evidence along these lines is indispensable to the Commission's
conclusion that all is well." Id. at 520.
114. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
115. "The Commission finds support for its action in its announced policy to ac-
celerate the inauguration of television service . . . .Without minimizing the force
of this objective, we think Congress did not intend that the Commission should
abandon consideration of long range public interests in order to further short and,
perhaps, doubtful ones. . . . [U]nless the Commission is properly assured that its
action will serve the public interest, it should not make any grant.
"We recognize that compliance with the procedural and public interest require-
inents of the Act may have the effect of ... depriving the people of Clarksburg of
immediate local television service. But that consideration does not, we think, justify
a grant which the Commission, when it receives and reviews all the pertinent evi-
dence, may determine is contrary to the public interest."
225 F.2d at 519. (Emphasis added.)
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justifying denial of a grant to a party purchasing sole applicant status.11 6 The
Commission should investigate not only whether actual applicants were paid to
withdraw but also whether potential applicants were financially induced to
refrain from entering the competition. Such a stringent approach will eliminate
an artificial restraint on the number of bidders from which the most qualified
may be chosen to operate available broadcasting facilities.
Transfers
A party may also circumvent the hazards of a comparative hearing and
benefit from a sole applicant status by purchasing a transfer or assignment from
a successful grantee. Under the Communications Act, transfers are subject
to FCC approval.1 17 Although the public interest standard governs the trans-
fer section of the act, a 1952 amendment provides that a transferee must be
considered as if it were a sole applicant. 118 In applying this statutory standard,
the Commission has sanctioned the purchase of transfers by parties more
concentrated than both the transferor and the defeated applicants of the initial
comparative hearing.
The Aladdin case 119 vividly illustrates how a party with vast mass media
holdings may, as transferee, take advantage of the lax administrative licensing
standards pertaining to sole applicants. After a long and close comparative
hearing, the FCC had awarded a Denver television channel to Aladdin Radio
and Television, Inc., which already operated an AM and FM station in Denver
and whose stockholders held substantial interests in a number of other stations. 12 0
116. Cf., e.g., Mansfield Journal Co., 3 RADIO REG. 2014, 2028 (1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d
28 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (refusal to enfranchise sole applicant because of predatory practices).
117. See 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1952) ; cf. S. REP.
No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1951).
In 1945, the Commission adopted the procedure of a competitive transfer system, re-
quiring transferors to advertise their proposed transfers in order to enable all interested
parties to compete for the Commission's grant. However, even prior to the amendment
the Commission had abandoned this procedure as causing administrative inefficiency and
severe economic hardships. See Statement of the Commission, 17 U.S.L. WE-xK 2412
(March 8, 1949).
118. "[I]n acting thereon the Commission may not consider whether the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity might be served by the transfer, assignment, or
disposal of the permit or license to a person other than the proposed transferee
or assignee."
48 STAT. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1952).
In the past the Commission had considered the relation of the price paid to the
value of the station, the qualifications of the transferee, and benefits to the public de-
riving from the grant. However, much of this scrutiny had been dropped even prior to
the 1952 amendment. See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351 (1955). Some writers have felt that
the amendment may limit inquiry to the broadcasting qualifications of the transferee.
See Wall & Jacob, supra note 110, at 153.
119. Aladdin Radio and Television, Inc., 9 RADIO REG. 1 (1953) (original grant);
10 RADIo REG. 773 (1954) (approving transfer). See Denver Television Co., 10 RADIO
RFG. 771 (1954) (denial of petition for revocation and reinstatement).
120. 9 RADIo REG. at 4-19.
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Aladdin's unsuccessful competitor, though unaffiliated, was found inferior in
terms of experience and extent of local ownership.121 Barely four months after
Aladdin had commenced broadcasting, it agreed to sell out to Time, Inc., a
New York publishing corporation dominant in the national magazine field.122
Denver Television, the rejected applicant in the comparative hearing, filed a
petition requesting revocation of the permit held by Aladdin and reinstatement
of its own earlier application. 123 The Commission held that the permit should
not be revoked, because Aladdin bad not fraudulently concealed facts at the
time of the hearing but had decided to sell out after the grant because of the
sudden illnesses of principal stockholders. 124 The Commission also approved the
transfer to Time, Inc., since it found that the operation of the station by the
transferee would not decrease the service presently rendered to the viewing
public.
125
By considering only the intent of the transferor at the time of its authorization
and the broadcasting competency of the transferee, the Commission failed to
apply a meaningful public interest standard. True, under the extremely dubious
precept of the statute that a transferee be treated as a sole applicant, 126 the Com-
mission could not compare Time, Inc. directly with Denver Television which
also desired the franchise. But the Commission should have recognized that
the public interest demanded evaluation of the consequences of enfranchising
a party already such a powerful influence in the communications sphere.' 27
Because of the combination of an unwise statutory standard and a narrow
administrative focus, a highly concentrated holder may avoid comparison with
an unaffiliated applicant also seeking a franchise and may be able to acquire
the desired station by making an irresistible offer to the existing licensee.' 28
121. Id. at 38-40. The Commission found it significant that while 58% of Aladdin
was owned by local citizens, only 51% of Denver was so owned. Also, a greater percentage
of Aladdin's stockholders were to assume management of the station as their full-time
occupations.
122. Denver Television Co., 10 RADIO REG. 771 (1954) ; Aladdin Radio and Television,
Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 773, 776-77 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
In addition to publishing such leading magazines as Time, Life and Fortune, the
transferee, at the time of the transfer, owned controlling stock interests in Albuquerque,
New Mexico and Salt Lake City, Utah television stations. Letter from Time, Inc., to
the Yale Law Journal, Nov. 20, 1956, on file in Yale Law Library.
123. Denver Television Co., 10 RADIO REG. 771, 772 (1954).
124. Ibid.
Under 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1952), the Commission
may revoke a grant for willful concealment or misrepresentation.
In the past the Commission has granted a renewal and summarily approved a transfer
of that renewed franchise on the same day. See, e.g., Sunland Broadcasting Co., 6 RADIO
REG. 1053, 1076 (1951); cf. Wrather-Alvarez, Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 539 (1954).
125. Aladdin Radio and Television, Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 773, 775 (1954).
126. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
127. See note 122 supra; Sherwood B. Brunton, 3 RADIO REG. 291 (1946) (denying
transfer of an AM station to CBS as against the public interest in diversification).
128. E.g., Aladdin's transfer to Time, Inc. resulted in a 2400% profit to Aladdin
stockholders. Aladdin Radio and Television, Inc., 10 RADIO REG. 773, 777 (1954) (dissent-
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The FCC has also permitted a concentrated party to compete for a franchise
in a comparative hearing and, if unsuccessful, to negotiate with the winning
applicant for an interest in the outlet. Accordingly, such a party may take ad-
vantage of two opportunities to obtain a desired station. It originally enters
the comparative hearing in the hope that its superior "experience" will offset
its vulnerability on diversification grounds. If a rival applicant prevails and
is granted the authorization, the party whose concentrated holdings led initially
to its defeat approaches the grantee with an attractive offer to purchase the
outlet or have it transferred to a jointly owned corporation. Of course such a
transfer is subject to FCC approval. Under the statute, the transferee must
be judged as a sole applicant, and the transfer must also serve the public interest.
But since the FCC has equated service of the public interest with fulfillment of
minimum standards of competency, the transfer will probably be approved.1
2
0
In Enterprise "o the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded to the
Commission for further consideration a transaction resembling the above pat-
tern. Three applicants had originally competed for the first VHF television
outlet in Beaumont, Texas.13 ' Enterprise Co. was an AM and FM licensee in
Beaumont, and also published the city's only morning, evening and Sunday
papers.3 2 Beaumont Broadcasting was an AM licensee in Beaumont, while
its largest stockholder controlled a television and AM station in a city 375
miles away.1 33 KTRM, the third applicant, operated an AM station in Beau-
mont.1'3 A Mr. Hobby held an option to purchase up to 35 per cent of the stock
of IKTRM; exercise of the option would have made him the largest individual
stockholder and increased his representation on the board of directors to one
less than a majority.13 5 Hobby dominated the mass media serving nearby
Houston through control of an AM, FM and TV station, as well as the city's
largest paper.16 Finding that the applicants were virtually equal on all other
criteria, the Commission held diversification to be determinative. 137 It awarded
the grant to Beaumont Broadcasting because of Enterprise's intense local con-
centration and Hobby's hold on neighboring Houston. 38
ing opinion). See notes 108, 109, 118 supra. As early as 1938 the Commission had asserted
that the price paid for the transferred outlet would not always be deemed a material con-
sideration. See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351, 355 (1955). But cf. 11 FCC ANN. REP. 12-13
(1945).
129. See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351, 364 nn.86-87 (1955).
130. Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
131. Enterprise Co., 9 RADIo REG. 818hh (1953) (initial order); 9 R.AIo R G. 816
(1954) (Commission decision); 9 RADIO REG. 818u (1955) (denial of petition for re-
consideration).
132. 9 RADIO REG. 818hh. 820 (1953) (initial order).
133. Id. at 823-25.
134. Id. at 826.
135. Id. at 827-29.
136. 9 RADIO REG. 816, 818p (1954) (Commission decision).
137. Id. at 818. This decision reversed the Hearing Examiner's determination on
this point. See 9 RADIO REG. 818hh, 884-85 (1953) (initial order).
138. 9 RADIO REG. 816, 818o-q (1954) (Commission decision).
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Between the time of the Commission's initial order and the expiration of
the appeal period, 130 Hobby entered into a contract with Beaumont Broadcast-
ing whereby the television permit granted the latter would be transferred to a
new corporation in which Hobby would purchase 32 per cent of the stock.
Hobby agreed to give up his stock option in KTRM and to pay KTRMI $55,000
compensation for application expenses. 140 KTRM then withdrew from the pro-
ceedings.141 In passing upon Enterprise's petition for reconsideration, the Com-
mission was presented with the question whether, in view of Hobby's alignment
with Beaumont, the latter was no longer superior on the determinative criterion
of diversification. The Commission concluded that the executory contract was
not related to the diversification issue, and that the public interest was fully
protected since any future transfer by Beaumont would have to meet with
the Commission's approval. 142 On Enterprise's appeal, the court held that the
contract had a direct bearing on the determinative criterion of diversification
and that the facts could properly be incorporated into the record, since they
were disclosed at a time when the Commission's decision was still open for
reconsideration. 143 The court also noted that the requirement of future approval
139. Both defeated applicants filed petitions for rehearing, thereby tolling the appeal
deadline. 9 RAnlO REG. 818u, 818v (1955) (denial of petition for reconsideration).
The act provides that petitions for rehearing must be filed within 30 days from date
of public notice of a Commission decision. The function of the rehearing is to provide
an opportunity for consideration of "newly discovered evidence, evidence which has be-
come available only since the original taking of evidence or evidence which the Com-
mission believes should have been taken in the original proceeding ...." The time within
which a petition for judicial review must be filed is computed from the date upon which
public notice is given of orders disposing of any petitions for rehearing. 48 STAT.
1095 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1952).
140. 9 RADIo REG. 818u, 818w-x (1955) (denial of petition for reconsideration);
id. at 818hh (dissenting opinion). The agreement was filed with the Commission within
30 days of execution, pursuant to the Rule providing that:
"Any agreement, document or instrument affecting, directly or indirectly, the
ownership or voting rights of the licensee's or permittee's stock... [and] options to
purchase stock, pledges, trust agreements, and other executory agreements are
required to be filed." Rules of the FCC, 47 C.F.R. § 1.342(b) (3) (Supp. 1956).
141. 9 RADIo REG. 818u, 818w (1955) (denial of petition for reconsideration).
142. Ibid.
"The Rules of the Commission adequately guard the public interest in their
application to such voluntary assignment of the television station construction
permit or license as in the future may be sought." Id. at 818x.
But, for discussion of the automatic approval which the FCC has usually given trans-
fers, see notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, since no facts have been
concealed from the Commission, the bar to assignment provided by § 312(a) will be
inapplicable here as it was in Aladdin, discussed at notes 119-26 supra.
143. Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 708, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See Albertson
v. FCC, 182 F.2d 397, 399-401 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (jurisdiction over an order remains with
the Commission until the appeal period has expired; that time period is tolled pending
determination of an application for rehearing).
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of any assignment by Beaumont was a poor substitute for a present comparison
of the applicants. 144
The Enterprise case illustrates how a determined, though concentrated, party
may frustrate diversification objectives and expand his telecommunications
interests with relative ease. On remand the Commission may well decide
to award Beaumont Broadcasting the outlet despite Hobby's Houston in-
terests. 145 KTRM no longer seeks the franchise, and a grant to Enterprise
would give it control of newspaper, AM, FM and television interests in the
city of Beaumont. In addition, the Commission has been loath to reject all
applicants, no matter how disserving of the public interest a grant to any
would be. 146 There is little doubt that the subsequent transfer by Beaumont
Broadcasting to the jointly owned station will receive administrative sanction.
If the transferee meets minimal standards of competency and capitalization,
the FCC will probably refuse to consider diversification principles in deter-
mining whether the public interest is served.' 47 Thus the Hobby interest may
gain entry into the Beaumont television field even though KTRlI, was origi-
nally judged inferior to Beaumont Broadcasting precisely because of Hobby's
holdings.
The court's decision in Enterprise hinged upon the fact that the executory
contract had been negotiated prior to the finality of the award in the compara-
tive hearing. In contrast to Aladdin, the grantee had manifested an intent
to transfer at the time of the authorization proceedings. When the Commission
is thus apprised that a grantee intends to share his franchise with a concentrated
party, it should reconsider whether affirmance of an initial grant will serve the
public interest. True, the concentrated party can circumvent such scrutiny, and
the directives of the Enterprise court, by not negotiating with the grantee until
after the grant has become final. But the disadvantage of this delay is that
the defeated party seeking to buy an interest in the station awarded its rival
will then be unable to employ the key bargaining point of agreeing to waive
appeal of the adverse decision.' 48 Should the party seek to conceal the agree-
ment from the Commission, then a suppression of material facts will have oc-
144. 231 F.2d at 712-13.
145. Rescheduled for a new comparative hearing before an Examiner, the case is still
pending. Note from FCC Office of Reports & Information to the Yale Law Journal,
Nov. 16, 1956, on file in Yale Law Library.
146. See, e.g., Radio Wisconsin, Inc., discussed in notes 57-66 supra and accompanying
text.
147. See Aladdin Radio and Television, Inc., discussed in notes 119-28 supra and
accompanying text. But see Sherwood B. Brunton, 3 RADIO REG. 291 (1946) (denying
an AM transfer to CBS). This case was decided prior to the 1952 amendment which
may be interpreted to delimit transfer inquiry to technical broadcasting qualifications of
the transferee. See Wall & Jacob, supra note 110, at 153.
148. The bargaining pressure of agreeing to waive administrative and judicial review
is considerable. See, e.g., KMYR Broadcast Co., 9 RADIO REG. 496 (1953) ($125,000
"reimbursement of expenses" for agreement to waive filing of exceptions).
[Vol. 66: 365
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FCC
curred justifying revocation of the grant.149 By establishing the relevancy of
executory contracts negotiated prior to final approval of a grant, the court in
Enterprise has made a contribution to the effectuation of diversification principles
in the comparative hearing. But the court can only exercise a judicial review
function. Since ultimate discretion is vested in the FCC,150 the Commission
itself must evaluate the impact of such contracts and take affirmative action to
block the transfer of franchises to concentrated holders.
THE VHF-UHF TELEVISION DICHOTOMY
The preceding review of the FCC's authorization practices must be viewed
in its most pressing context: VHF and UHF allocation.' 51 Though the Com-
mission early recognized that both VHF and UHF channels would have to be
utilized in order to maximize competitive nationwide servicing,152 until 1948
it allocated only VHF stations.'5 3 These facilities were generally granted to
large, established broadcasters, which were able to devote vast technical and
financial resources to perfecting the new medium. 54 From 1948 until 1952 the
FCC "froze" television authorizations in order to devise a nationwide master
plan allocating as great a number of VHF and UHF channels as would be
technically feasible. 15  When completed, the plan provided for over twice as
many UHF as VHF stations.156
149. See 48 SrAT. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1952) ; cf. FCC v.
WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Broadcast Serv. Organization, Inc., 3 RADIO REG. 979
(1947).
150. See notes 5 and 22 supra and accompanying text.
151. "Each television station operates on a 6-megacycle channel or wave-length
assigned to it by the Federal Communications Commission. There are 82 such
channels, 12 of them . . . in the very-high-frequency (VHF) portion of the radio
spectrum and 70 of them . . . in the ultra-high-frequency (UHF) band. Each
band was assigned to television at a different stage of television's development
and each has different technical qualities."
Plotldn, Menwrandum Prepared for the Senate Committee On Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Memorandum).
152. FCC R~roRT (May 25, 1945), discussed in Memorandum at 1. See also 11 FCC
ANN. REP. 21 (1945).
153. See Jones, Progress Report Prepared for the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1955) (hereinafter referred to as Pro-
gress Report).
154. See Heckman, Diversification of Control of the Media of Mass Communication--
Policy or Fallacy?, 42 GEo. L.J. 378, 383 (1954) ; cf. SMPMANN, RADio, Tzi zvsioN AND
SociFTr 326-29 (1950) (collecting Commission statistics).
155. The freeze was lifted shortly after announcement of the master plan. See 17
FED. REG. 3905 (1952). A guiding principle of the plan had been to place VHF stations
in the larger market areas. Id. at 3912. Several of the Commissioners dissented from
complete endorsement of the plan because of inadequate allocation adjustment of UHF-
VHF differences. Id. at 4086-95; cf. Memorandum at 3.
See also Logansport Broadcasting Corp., v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (upholding the master plan as a valid exercise of Commission power under the
act) ; cf. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(d), (f), (r) (1952).
156. The master plan allocated 556 VHF and 1,319 UHF authorizations as the optimum
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When the FCC resumed authorization of television facilities after the
freeze, it became apparent that UHF licensees would be at a serious com-
petitive disadvantage vis-A-vis VHF licensees serving the same locale. During
the freeze, manufacturers had flooded the market with sets capable of receiv-
ing only VHF broadcasting; thus UHF grantees found their potential audience
severely limited.157 Complementing this restriction was the fact that, though
the picture quality of UHF is as good as VHF, UHF is technically capable
of servicing only a far smaller area. 15 Because of the inferior coverage of
UHF, national advertisers have naturally preferred to patronize rival VHF
licensees.' 59 In addition, networks not directly affiliated with a VHF outlet
in a major broadcasting area have elected to place "re-runs" with another net-
work's local VHF affiliate rather than broadcast "live" over a UHF station.,o
UHF stations have competed successfully among themselves, and empirical
evidence indicates that they can survive in the same market with one VHF
outlet. 61 But when UHF licensees have been confronted with more than one
VHF rival, they have frequently been forced to cease operations.
62
In evaluating whether authorization of a VHF applicant will serve the public
interest, the FCC has often disregarded the competitive superiority of the VHF
outlet, and the consequent impact of the grant on established UHF operators. 10 3
For example, in the Radio Wisconsin case there was evidence that a grant of
the VHF outlet to either of the concentrated applicants would force the two
unaffiliated UHF licensees servicing Madison out of business. 1' 4 Enfranchise-
ment of either VHF candidate compounded the leverage advantages and eco-
number which could operate nationally. See Progress Report at 27; 17 FED. REG. 3905-26
(1952). However, only 411 television stations were in operation by 1954 as compared
with 2,616 AM and 559 FM stations. See Memnorandum at 42.
157. When the "freeze" was instituted in 1948, less than one million sets were in use.
By July 1952, this number had swelled to seventeen million. All of these sets were capable
of receiving only VHF channels. See id. at 3. By 1954, more than thirty million VHF-only
receivers were in the public's hands. See Progress Report at 7.
158. Though UHF has an even better picture quality than VHF because its higher
frequency band relieves it from normal electrical interference, UHF signals do not have
the range of VHF and give spotty service within an area of rugged terrain. See Memo-
rand 'm at 4. In addition, UHF broadcasting equipment is more costly than VHF equip-
ment. See Progress Report at 6-7.
159. See Memorandum at 3, 6; Progress Report at 27; note 164 infra.
160. See Memorandum at 6.
When a licensee is deprived of a network affiliation contract, it is precluded from en-
joying crucial advantages. Sponsored network progTams have great consumer appeal,
give the affiliate a share of national advertising revenues, and save it the expense of
preparing its own programming. Id. at 16.
161. See id. at 4-5.
162. Ibid. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Conmittee On Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on S. 2926, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 144-48, 189-96 (1954).
163. See notes 66 and 157-59 supra.
164. 10 RADio REG. 1224, 1250 (1954) (dissenting opinion). See notes 65 and 66
supra and accompanying text.
See also Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 14 RA~io REG. 129 (1956), denying a protest for re-
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nomic savings inherent in concentrated holdings with the superior audience
coverage of any, VHF rival. Showing a regrettable insensitivity to diversifica-
tion principles in the VHF-UHF context, the FCC refused to consider that it
was introducing one concentrated VHF holder at the cost of destroying two
unaffiliated UHF parties. Had the VHF channel been awarded to an unaffili-
ated applicant, the grant might have been justified, since a new voice would
have been added to the locale and the UHF licensees would not have been forced
to compete with the benefits of concentration as well as superior audience
coverage.
The FCC and the Interstate Commerce Committee have been investigating
methods of alleviating the competitive destruction of UHF stations. Proposals
have been suggested to spur the production of sets capable of receiving both
UHF and VHF channels.0 5 Such a solution would be of only partial effective-
ness, since advertisers and networks may still be swayed by the greater service
area of VHF transmission. It has been suggested that this discrepancy be
eliminated by restricting the broadcasting range of all VHF stations.1 66 The
most far-reaching suggestion for solving the UHF problem has been to shift
all or a substantial proportion of commercial television to UHF frequencies
only, reserving VHF channels for nonprofit, educational uses.167 In addition
the FCC has held preliminary hearings on the feasibility of "deintermixing"
certain areas, that is, of permitting only VHF or only UHF outlets to operate
in a given competitive market. Yet, the Commission has continued to authorize
VHF outlets in areas tentatively scheduled for UHF deintermixture, despite
the protests of the established UHF broadcasters. 6 8
consideration lodged by a UHF licensee against the grant of actual operation authoriza-
tion to Radio Wisconsin. The protester's allegations were as follows:
"[Aldvertisers who previously have used [protester's UHF] facilities have advised
[protester] that they propose to give their business to [Radio Wisconsin], and
others have simply not renewed advertising contracts; . . . Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) has advised [protester] that it will switch from [protester's UHF
facilities] to [Radio Wisconsin's VHF facilities] . . . . [T]his loss of network pro-
grams will result not only in loss of network revenue, but also will result in loss
of non-network revenues received from advertisers attracted to the station because
of its CBS programming, and in substantial additional cost . . . to replace the
lost CBS programs .... [T]he commencement of VHF service in Madison will slow
the conversion rate or rate of purchase of all-channel television sets, thus increasing
the competitive disadvantage under which . . . a UHF broadcaster is forced to
operate."
Id. at 130. See also Monona Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
165. For example, it has been suggested that all-channel sets be exempted from the
federal excise tax, and that interstate shipment of receivers capable of receiving only VHF
be barred. See Memorandum at 12-14; Progress Report at 30; N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1956,
p. 20, col. 4.
166. Cf. Progress Report at 6-8.
167. See id. at 29-30, criticizing this proposal as unacceptable to the more than thirty
million VHF-only set owners and to the television industry as well. Cf. Memorandum at
7-11.
168. Greylock Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Coastal
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Recent experience has indicated that the 1,319 UHF outlets allocated under
the master plan cannot be effectively utilized unless the inherent competitive
obstacles faced by the UHF holder are eliminated. 16 9 Present proposals for
accomplishing this goal are subject to the criticism that they necessitate some
restriction on the maximum utilization of all technically available television
outlets. Restricting the broadcasting range of VHF stations will deprive resi-
dents in fringe areas of additional, and technically feasible, programming ;170
deintermixture may well compel the idleness of allocable VHF or UHF outlets
in locales reserved exclusively for the other frequency bands; limiting com-
mercial broadcasting to UHF only will impair optimum employment of avail-
able channels in the VHF range. Moreover, insulation of the UHF holder
from the competition of the technically superior VHF outlet will not alleviate
major economic disadvantages faced by an unaffiliated licensee in competition
with a concentrated party.
TOWARD A REVITALIZED DIVERSIFICATION POLICY
The foregoing analysis has indicated the policy conflict between diversi-
fication principles and authorization of as many stations as possible as quickly
as possible. In formulating a public interest standard, the FCC has favored
rapid authorization and operation at the cost of subordinating diversification.
The Commission has failed to evolve affirmative standards for determining
when a concentrated sole applicant, or two or more competing concentrated
applicants, should be denied enfranchisement to prevent strangle holds on the
mass media already serving a given locale and preclusion of future entry
by unaffiliated sources o2 dissemination. Today television stations are in oper-
ation throughout the nation; a blanket policy of rapid authorization cannot be
justified by the need for experimental allocation or the need for immediately
reaching a totally unserviced populace. In authorizing and allocating VHF-
UHF television outlets, the Commission must now focus upon the long-range
goal of diversified control.
Authorization Policy
Concededly, under some circumstances a party should still be permitted to
expand its holdings in the mass media. At times the public interest will demand
Bend Television Co. v. FCC, 234 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Cf. Radio Wisconsin, Inc.,
14 RADIO REG. 129, 130 (1956) ; Travelers Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 13 RADIO REG. 634,
636 n.1 (1956) ; Biscayne Television Corp., 13 RADIO REG. 423, 424a-h (1956).
169. Of the 578 commercial television authorizations issued since the freeze, 318
have been in the UHF band. Of these, 118 have already cancelled or suspended operations
because of economic hardships. By contrast, only 23 of the 358 VHF stations authorized
since 1946 have cancelled or suspended operations. Mentorandion at 5.
170. See Columbia Broadcasting System, An Analysis of Senator John TV. Brickcer's
Report entitled 'The Network Monopoly" 49 (prepared for Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, June 1956).
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that an audience be given immediate programming, despite the irreparable
harm to diversification. In those few communities of the country which presently
enjoy no television servicing, or receive but one station, there are cogent factors
in favor of enfranchising an affiliated party which alone applies for an outlet.
Perhaps only such an applicant may be able to make television an economically
winning proposition in an area of low advertising revenue potential. As an ex-
isting operator in the mass media field, with already established news gathering,
programming and advertising placement facilities, this party can rely upon
substantial economies of dual operation when embarking upon the television
venture. If there are other outlets technically allocable to the locale, enfranchise-
ment of the party with mass media affiliations will not preclude future authori-
zation of an unaffiliated applicant which may desire to enter the local television
field when the potential advertising revenue increases.
Absent the above circumstances, the Commission should be extremely reluc-
tant to enfranchise a party which already enjoys a substantial hold on the mass
media serving a given locale or is connected with a sizable number of sources
of dissemination throughout the nation. When a community is already serviced
by spill-overs from neighboring stations or by any established local channels,
when the franchise to be granted is the sole or one remaining available outlet
allocated to the locale, when it appears that the advertising revenue to be ex-
pended upon an area will be sufficient to attract an unaffiliated licensee which
cannot utilize the savings effected by spreading common costs over several
operations-in these cases concentrated parties should not be granted virtually
perpetual franchises. These principles should be applied with equal vigor in
the sole applicant and comparative hearing contexts. If the sole applicant or
all competing applicants have considerable localized or nationwide mass media
holdings, and if the special circumstances militating in favor of rapid authori-
zation are not present, the franchise should be withheld.
In those cases where the public interest in immediate programming justifies
an extension of a party's mass media holdings, the FCC can minimize the en-
suing injury to diversification by granting such party a UHF outlet, if one is
available and if UHF audience coverage is sufficient to fulfill the needs of
the community to be serviced. Accordingly, any VHF outlets in the locale will
remain open for future entry by unaffiliated applicants. Under these circum-
stances, an unaffiliated party which desires to enter the locale already serviced
by the concentrated licensee will find the economic prospects much more
attractive. For the superior audience coverage which the VHF operator would
enjoy over its UHF competitor will serve to balance the economic savings
and leverage advantages available to the affiliated UHF party.
Post-Authorization Surveillance
In addition to following the above policy with respect to unauthorized chan-
nels, the Commission should maximize the counterbalance to concentration ad-
vantages inherent in the VHF-UHF dichotomy by making key authorization
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changes at the renewal stage. A substantial portion of the technically available
VHF outlets have already been allocated, many of them being in the hands of
unduly concentrated holders. While it might be inequitable to divest such
parties of all television enfranchisement, the FCC should consider switching
them to as yet unauthorized UHF stations allocated to the area, or else ex-
changing their present VHF frequency with the UHF frequency of a local un-
affiliated licensee. The former alternative will free superior VHF stations for
potential award to unaffiliated newcomers; the latter will effectively relieve an
established UHF independent from the burden of competing with a party enj oy-
ing both a technically superior outlet and the economic advantages of concen-
tration.
As part of a revitalized plan fostering diversified control in television, the
Commission must supplement an enlightened policy at the authorization and
renewal stages with a careful scrutiny of transfers. A transfer to an affiliated
party should be deemed disserving of the public interest unless the need for
continued service is so urgent that the transferee, had it been a sole applicant,
would have been properly enfranchised despite its mass media holdings. If a
transfer is thus disapproved and the initial licensee still desires to discontinue
operations, the Commission should accept new applicants for the outlet, one
of the financial qualifications being ability to pay the licensee a fair price for
the facilities relinquished. The Commission should then authorize a qualified
applicant in whose hands a grant will promote diversification objectives. This
administrative approach should be supplemented by congressional action to
terminate the statutory weaknesses pervading the transfer context. Under the
present statute, if the public interest demands immediate employment of the
station sought to be transferred, even an enlightened FCC must approve an
assignment to a concentrated holder, although qualified unaffiliated parties
desire the franchise.171 The section governing transfers should be amended
to provide that if a licensee desires to transfer its franchise, the Commission is
authorized to conduct comparative hearings, open to all parties, to select a
qualified successor. 1" 2
171. See notes 117 and 118 supra and accompanying text.
172. See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351, 365 (1955).
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